Mr. Merrill to Mr. Blaine. No. 255.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, Honolulu, August 1, 1889. SIRS: I have the honor to inclose a very full account, from the "Bulletin" of Honolulu, of an attempt made on the 30th ultimo, by about 100 half-castes and natives, under the leadership of Robert W. Wilcox and Robert Boyd, two half-castes Hawaiians, to overthrow the present Government of Hawaii and depose the King. This is supposed to be their purpose, although their exact intention is not yet fully known. About 6 o'clock a. m. a message from the King informed me that an armed party, led by Mr. Wilcox, was in possession of the palace 179 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. grounds, and soon thereafter it was learned that insurgents were in charge of the building containing the Government offices. As soon as possible I had communication with Commander Woodward of the U.S.S. Adams, and at once all necessary preparations were made to land a force, if found necessary for protection of people and property interests. Soon thereafter I met His Majesty's minister of foreign affairs, who informed me that a cabinet council would be held forthwith. Soon after the news of the affair became generally know, the British, Portuguese, and French commissioners called at the legation, and while comparing information regarding the situation, Mr. Damon, the newly appointed minister of finance, arrived and stated that it was the desire of His Majesty's ministers to meet the foreign representatives at once. It was deemed advisable to comply with this request without delay. On meeting the ministers they stated that they desired to fully inform us of their contemplated action in the present emergency, and that they had determined to occupy the tops of the buildings commanding a view of the palace grounds, with sharpshooters, for the purpose of preventing the use of the cannon which were known to be in the possession of the insurgents inside the walls inclosing the palace grounds, gradually surround and finally dislodge them with other forces. After learning the intention of the Government to operate at once with an armed force, I suggested the propriety of Mr. Damon, one of the members of the cabinet who speaks the native language, endeavoring to communicate with Mr. Wilcox, the leader of the insurgents, and ascertain, if possible, the cause of his action and what his demands were, if any; then if Mr. Damon failed, that the representative of foreign powers endeavor to obtain an interview with Wilcox, and by their good offices effect a peaceful settlement if possible. This was cordially agreed to by all and the representatives withdrew with the understanding that Mr. Damon would inform us of the result of his mission. In about one-half hour Mr. Damon reported to me at the legation that Mr. Wilcox refused to receive any communication from him whatever, and that while he was seeking to communicate with him firing commences; he deemed it not only imprudent, but suicidal for anyone to attempt to approach the palace grounds on a peace mission. At this juncture, as the report of small arms and cannon came from the palace grounds and immediate vicinity quite rapidly, and as many with alarm were coming to the legation, I at once requested Commander Woodward to send to the legation a body of marines, which request he promptly complied with. The appearance of the marines on the streets and at the legation had a very favorable effect on the populace. Soon the report of the large guns ceased by reason of the inability of the insurgents to operate them in the presence of the fire of the sharpshooters on the tops of the surrounding buildings. The "bungalow" mentioned in the newspaper account and into which the insurgents retreated is a frame building situated in the corner of the palace grounds sometimes used by the King as a dwelling and for offices. The palace square comprises about 4 acres, situated two blocks from the central business part of the city, and is entirely inclosed by a concrete wall about 8 feet high, while the King's palace is situated in the center of the square. 180 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. In the afternoon, and as soon as I ascertained from one of the cabinet ministers that an attempt would be made to dislodge the insurgents from the "bungalow" before dark by the use of dynamite, and as there were large crowds of people congregated on the streets, I deemed it advisable to ask for the landing of the remainder of the forces from the Adams before dark as a precautionary measure in the event any assistance to preserve order might be required, and to be immediately available in the event a conflagration should start. In this matter Commander Woodward fully agreed, and by permission of the minister of foreign affairs the forces landed about 5 o'clock p.m. Early the following morning all the men belonging to the Adams returned to the ship. The members of the cabinet and many prominent residents expressed much commendation of the prompt landing of the men, and remarked upon the very salutary effect their presence seemed to have among the people on the streets. The U. S. S. Adams was the only naval vessel in port. The British ship Espiegle recently left under sealed orders on a cruise south. This disturbance at this time was wholly unexpected by the Government officials as well as nearly every permanent resident. Although for several weeks it was known that Wilcox was endeavoring to draw around him as many disappointed native political aspirants as possible, yet it was recently ascertained on what seemed very reliable authority that no overt acts would be committed prior to the next general election in February, when it was thought the present ministers would be defeated at the polls. However, the success of the Government in subduing the insurgents, it is thought, will draw some to its support, and the general feeling is that the Government will be strengthened by the result of the conflict. Immediately after the surrender of the insurgents the city was quiet and still remains so, while business is being transacted as usual. As to the exact number of the insurgents it is difficult now to determine, as some deserted in the early morning. About 80 prisoners were secured. No serious casualties occurred except to the insurgents. In order that you may be promptly informed of the principal facts a week in advance of the regular mail, I will forward by the steamer leaving her to-morrow a telegram, to be wired from San Francisco, of which the following is a copy: On July 30 unsuccessful attempt by about one hundred half-castes and natives to overthrow Government and depose King. Insurrection suppressed by Hawaiian Government without foreign aid. Six insurgents killed, 12 wounded. Order restored same day. Men from U. S. S. Adams landed by permission, to protect lives and property if found necessary; afterwards returned to ship. Before sealing this dispatch I shall inclose clippings from newspapers giving latest intelligence, but will be unable to properly paste and arrange them. Trusting my action may merit the approval of the Department, I have the honor, etc., GEO. W. MERRILL. 181 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine. No. 46.] UNITED STATES LEGATION, Honolulu, February 8, 1892. SIR: The semiannual election of members of the Hawaiian legislature took place February 3, after several weeks of exciting canvass. The principal issue on the part of the business men and more conservative and responsible citizens was in respect of treaty relations with the United States. These supporters of the proposed new treaty which they believe has been negotiated at Washington had the approval of the principal Government officials, thought the cabinet is far from being vigorous and influential. The opposition, or Liberals, as they term themselves, composed mostly of the irresponsible white voters, half-castes, and of a large majority of the native Hawaiians, pushed their canvass on three lines--a new constitution, opposition to the present cabinet, and hostility to the proposed treaty, though it finally hedged and disclaimed more or less in regard to the last. These so-called Liberals were led by Wilcox, the half-caste who was at the head of the revolutionary outbreak in July, 1887, and by C. W. Ashford, the Canadian member of the cabinet, who betrayed and deserted his associates when Minister Carter was trying to negotiate a new treaty in 1889. This Ashford has some ability, any amount of audacity, and is utterly without scruples, and has done his utmost to influence the prejudices and passions of the native Hawaiians. Both he and Wilcox secured their election as representatives from this island. The legislature is composed of 48 members, one-half being nobles elected by property holding or income voters. The Conservatives and friends of the treaty have secured most all of the nobles and enough of the representatives to give them a decisive majority, sufficient, it is thought, to secure the approval of the treaty, even with the Pearl Harbor grant in perpetuity. Not improbably there may be a change of cabinet when the legislature assembles in May. There are increasing indications that the annexation sentiment is growing among the business men as well as with the less responsible of the foreign and native population of the islands. The present political situation is feverish, and I see no prospect of its being permanently otherwise until these islands become a part of the American Union or a possession of Great Britain. The intelligent and responsible men here, unaided by outside support, are too few in numbers to control in political affairs and to secure good government. There are indications that even the "Liberals," just beaten at the election, though composed of a majority of the popular vote, are about to declare for annexation, at least their leaders, their chief newspaper having already published editorials to this effect. At a future time, after the proposed treaty shall have been ratified, I shall deem it my official duty to give a more elaborate statement of facts and reasons why a "new departure" by the United States as to Hawaii is rapidly becoming a necessity, that a protectorate" is impracticable, and that annexation must be the future remedy, or else Great Britain will be furnished with circumstances and opportunity to get a hold on these islands which will cause future serious embarrassment to the United States. At this time there seems to be no immediate prospect of its being safe to have the harbor of Honolulu left without an American vessel of war. Last week a British gunboat arrived here, and it is said will remain here for an indefinite period. I am, sir, etc., JOHN L. STEVENS. 182 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine. No. 48.] UNITED STATES LEGATION, Honolulu, March 8, 1892. SIR: In view of possible contingencies in these islands, I ask for the instructions of the Department of State on the following, viz: If the Government here should be surprised and overturned by an orderly and peaceful revolutionary movement, largely of native Hawaiians and a provisional or republican government organized and proclaimed, would the United States minister and naval commander here be justified in responding affirmatively to the call of the members of the removed Government to restore them to power or replace them in possession of the Government buildings? Or should the United States minister and naval commander confine themselves exclusively to the preservation of American property, the protection of American citizens, and the prevention of anarchy? Should a revolutionary attempt of the character indicated be made, there are strong reasons to presume that it would begin with the seizure of the police station, with its arms and ammunitions, and this accomplished, the Royal Palace and the Government building, containing the cabinet offices and archives, would very soon be captured, the latter building being situated about one-third of a mile from the police station. In such contingencies would it be justifiable to sue the United States forces here to restore the Government buildings to the possession of the displaced officials? Ordinarily in like circumstances the rule seems to be to limit the landing and movement of the United States force in foreign waters and dominion exclusively to the protection of the United States legation, and of the lives and property of American citizens. But as the relations of the United States to Hawaii are exceptional, and in former years the United States officials here took somewhat exceptional action in circumstances of disorder, I desire to know how far the present minister and naval commander may deviate from established international rules and precedents in the contingencies indicated in the first part of this dispatch. I have information which I deem reliable that there is an organized revolutionary party on the islands, composed largely of native Hawaiians and a considerable number of whites and half whites, led chiefly by individuals of the latter two classes. This party is hostile to the Queen and to her chief confidants, especially opposed to the coming to the throne of the half-English heir apparent, now being educated in England, and means to gain its object either by forcing the Queen to select her cabinet from its own members, or else to overthrow the monarchy and establish a republic with the ultimate view of annexation to the United States of the whole islands. A portion of this party mean only the former, and the other portion intend the latter. Failing to accomplish the former, the most of the party would seek the latter alternative. I have little doubt the revolutionary attempt would have been made ere this but for the presence here of the United States ship-of-war. I still incline to the opinion that the revolutionary attempt will not be made so long as there is a United States force in the harbor of Honolulu, but it would be rash to assume or assert this positively. Therefore I deem it my official duty to ask for instructions in view of possible contingencies. I may add that the annexation sentiment is increasing, quite as much among the white residents and native Hawaiians, and other workingmen who own no sugar stock, as with the sugar planters. I am, sir, etc., JOHN S. STEVENS. 183 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy. Copy No. 275.] UNITED STATES CRUISER SAN FRANCISCO, FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION, San Francisco, Cal., September 6, 1892. Hon. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. : SIR: At the time this ship sailed from Honolulu, on the 27th ultimo, everything was extremely quiet. There is a strong sentiment existing in Hawaii, among the native Hawaiians as well as among the Americans and Germans, in favor of a change in the form of government, looking toward the ultimate annexation of the islands to the United States. This subject of annexation has been freely discussed by individuals for a long time, but until very recently there has been no combined concert of action. There now exists in Honolulu an organization comprising the most prominent annexationists, which has for its object the formulation of some plan by which a change of government can be affected quietly, and with the consent and cooperation of the Queen and the members of her cabinet and staff. It is thought that the Queen will consent to abdicate in favor of a republican form of government if she can be assured that a suitable provision will be made for her in the way of a permanent pecuniary settlement. The organization I refer to will not countenance anything of a revolutionary character in the way of force, but expects to be aided by the majority of the Hawaiians who now favor annexation without having any ides of how such an event can be reached. A change in the present cabinet will certainly be made before the present legislature adjourns. There is trouble in obtaining a new cabinet, because the reform parties can not agree on the men to go into the different positions. The liberal party is in the majority, and will not be allowed to have any voice in the question of the new ministry. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEO. BROWN, Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Pacific Station. __________ Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster. [Confidential.] No. 65.] UNITED STATES LEGATION, Honolulu, September 14, 1892. SIR: In my dispatch, No. 64, of September 9, I expressed the hope that I would be able to send the information by this mail that a new Hawaiian cabinet had been formed to take the place of the one so emphatically voted out by the legislature, but the deadlock between the Queen and the legislature continues. She has announced a new cabinet, but it is so unsatisfactory to the legislative majority and the business men of the islands that it will undoubtedly be rejected to- day; but the vote will not be taken in time to send the information of the fact by this mail, which closes at 11 a. m. The Tahitian half-caste fa- 184 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. vorite of the Queen, the marshal of the little kingdom, and his band of adventurers, still dominate the palace and defy the responsible men of the legislature and the islands. An associate of the half-caste favorite is an American renegade by the name of Whaley, a disgraced and expelled San Francisco custom-house official, now at the head of the "opium ring," and one of the supposed owners of the Halcyon, the notorious smuggling schooner which flits between these islands and British Columbia. This man Whaley has more than the Tahitian favorite. The better portion of the English residents are in substantial accord with the principal Americas in support of the legislature, and the chief German commercial houses and influential German residents are in full agreement with the American; but more or less of the English are so jealous of the strong American sentiment in the legislature that they support the Queen and the Tahitian favorite openly or covertly. The native Hawaiians, composing half of the legislature, are about equally divided. The unscrupulous adventurers of different nationalities--Americans, English, and Germans, without character, and most of them without property--are with the half-caste Tahitian favorite and the Queen. A majority of the legislature and the best citizens of the islands are exercising remarkable forbearance and self-control. It is proper for me to say that just at this time Mr. Mott Smith, the present minister at Washington, is likely to be misinformed as to the real condition of things, for the rejected minister of foreign affairs, a native Hawaiian, of the Queen's supporters, still occupies the foreign office, and the American deputy would hardly dare to send any advices to Minister Smith not indorsed by the acting head of the department. The U. S. S. Boston is in the harbor, and Capt. Wiltse will cooperate with me in exercising careful circumspection. In about twelve days from this I can send another dispatch. I am, sir, etc., JOHN. L. STEVENS. _________ Capt. Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy. U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE), Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, October 12, 1892. The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.: SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 14th of September the introduction in the Hawaiian legislature of a want of confidence resolution in the new ministry resulted in a vote of 24 to 21 in favor of the resolution. The opposition claimed that the resolution had passed, but the ministry declared it required a vote of 25 to pass, and the chair sustained them. As the question hinged on an interpretation of the constitution, the matter was referred to the supreme court, which decided in favor of the ministry. On October 4 an election was held to fill the vacant seats of two members. The ministerial party raised the cry of anti-annexation and were ardently supported by the British and other foreigners. Unwarranted attacks were made (in my opinion for political purposes) up- 185 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. on the United States representatives by anonymous writers in the official organ of the Government. The election resulted in a victory for the ministry. The British representatives manifest the most unusual interest, publicly, in all political proceedings. The action of the ministry, with possibly one exception, and of the English element, is plainly in opposition to the United States. There is a large and growing sentiment, particularly among the planters, in favor of annexation to the United States, but I am informed that the leaders do not think an opportune moment will arrive for some time to come. However, everything seems to point toward an eventual request for annexation. The political situation at present is more quiet and will probably remain so until another resolution of want of confidence is passed, which is not likely in the immediate future. The financial question is the most important question to be met by the ministry. Very respectfully, G. C. WILTSE, Captain, Commanding. __________ Capt. Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy. U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE), Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, October 20, 1892. The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.: SIR: I have the honor to report that, since my last letter, on Monday, October 17, a want of confidence resolution was unexpectedly introduced and passed by a vote of 31 to 15, forcing the ministry to resign. The political situation is still unsettled. It is thought that the names of the new cabinet will be sent to the legislature by Monday next, October 24. If the new ministry is acceptable to the majority, legislation will be resumed and affairs become more settled. If, however, the Queen persists in consulting only her own inclination, regardless of the wishes of the opposition, which is a large majority, it is difficult to predict what will be the outcome. I inclose a paper giving an account of the proceedings, etc., when the want of confidence resolution was introduced. Very respectfully, G. C. WILTSE, Captain, Commanding. __________ Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster. [Confidential.] No. 72.] UNITED STATES LEGATION, Honolulu, October 31, 1892. SIR: In dispatch 71 of October 19 I gave account of the rejection of the new cabinet appointed by the Queen in defiance of a previously expressed majority of the legislature. The deadlock continues. Though two weeks have elapsed since the decisive action of the legis- 186 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. lature no ministers have been designated to fill the vacancies. The Tahitian favorite and the Queen still refuse to take the legislative majority and the leading business men of the islands into their confidence. The palace is still thronged and surrounded by the worst elements, and the responsible citizens feel that they are not welcomed as advisors. The Queen and the Tahitian have made several new ministerial slates with one responsible man and three of the other kind; but no responsible man, so far, can be found who will go into the cabinet with the three whom only a minority of the legislature will accept. Thus there is here, on a small scale, the old historic issue between autocracy and parliamentary responsibility. The foreign adventurers and renegades stand by the Tahitian favorite because he is the instrument which they can use, and he adheres to them because he needs their support. In the meantime the legislature is unable to do business and has been in session only a few hours for several weeks. If that body holds firm, the Queen will have to yield, and a responsible minority would probably be the result. The ultra-English influence is strongly with the half-English Tahitian favorite and the Queen, for the one reason only, that the success of the legislative majority would be the appointment of a cabinet strongly American in sympathy and purpose. There are strong reasons for the belief that were it not for the presence of the American naval force in the harbor the Tahitian marshal and his gang would induce the Queen to attempt a coup d'etat by proclaiming a new constitution, taking from the legislature the power to reject ministerial appointments. The recent arrival here from England of T. H. Davies, the head of a strong English house in Honolulu, formerly a resident here for many years, has served to intensify the ultra-English feeling and to strengthen the American sentiment. This T. H. Davies having made himself rich under the sugar provisions of the reciprocity treaty, now resides in England and has a kind of supervisory care of the half- white Hawaiian crown princess, for several years and still at school in England. When a resident here at the time the Pearl Harbor provision was pending, Davies strongly opposed that provision. He comes now with revived zeal against the Pearl Harbor concession. It is not thought that he has any encouragement to this course from the home Government of England, but that his course is his own, and that his zeal in increased by the Canadian Pacific Railroad mangers, of whom Davies is the agent. The desperate efforts of that road to save itself embrace the scheme of a cable, and Pacific steamer lines to Australia and China, including the design of antagonizing the interests of the United States in these islands. This involves the plan of controlling the Hawaiian monarchy through the present Queen and her favorite, and especially by the having in hand the crown princess, the general belief being that the present Queen will not live many years. Davies, who has this supervising care of the crown princess in England, is a tory. Of course these facts, so apparent to intelligent observers here, are telling on all friends of the United States. The other of the two principal English commercial houses here, older and nearly as wealthy as those of Davies & Co., is thoroughly Americanized and stands firmly against the efforts of T. H. Davies, and is for the United States on every issue. This house owns several hundreds of thousands (of dollars worth?) of property in Iowa and California, its head being father-in-law of Gen. Dimond, the head of the United States mint in San Francisco. 187 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. Perhaps it is well to state that it is the rumor here that the last rejected cabinet, only holding their places until others are appointed, have sent a dispatch to Washington asking the recall of Consul- General Severance. I do not credit this rumor. But influential parties have called at this legation who say that if any such step has been taken by this rejected cabinet, the American merchants and business men, as well as other leading citizens, will send a strong memorial to the Department of State against any such action of a dead ministry. I have not encouraged any such action in our behalf, believing it to be unnecessary. So far I am supported here by all the responsible Americans and others to a degree more than I had the right to expect. This so much the more impresses on me the necessity of prudence as well as of firmness. Top keep the Department of State well informed as to affairs here, I deem it well to give these particulars. I am, sir, etc., JOHN L. STEVENS. _______ [Later.] NOVEMBER 1, 1892. Names of the new cabinet sent to the legislature this morning. Resolution of "want of confidence" passed in one house, and thirty minutes after the names of the new ministry were read, and only 13 votes out of 48 members of whom the legislature is composed were in their favor. The strongest objections are to the minister of foreign affairs and to the minister of finance--Joseph Mamohi and William H. Cornwell--both of them unqualified and very unacceptable to the more responsible men of all nationalities. As they will assume to hold their places until their successors shall have been appointed, they may attempt to do some strange things. As Cornwell, for some reason, is hostile to the American minister and to the consul-general, would not be surprised should he induce his associates to ask for our recall. Possibly they may hold their places one week, as the legislature has adjourned for six days to allow the Queen time to select their successors. JOHN L. STEVENS. __________ Capt. Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy. U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE), Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 1, 1892. The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.: SIR: Respecting the state of political affairs in the Hawaiian Kingdom, I have the honor to report that, after much delay, a cabinet was sent to the legislature to-day and was immediately voted out by a vote of 26 to 13. The legislature then adjourned until November 7, having yesterday refused to pass appropriation bills for the running expenses of the Government. Meanwhile the salaries of all officials are overdue and must 188 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. remain unpaid until the legislature appropriates the money according to law. The Queen persists in refusing to appoint a cabinet in conformity with the wishes of the majority, and it is possible that her obstinacy may precipitate a crisis. Very respectfully, G. C. WILTSE, Captain, Commanding U. S. S. Boston. _________ Capt. Wiltse to the Secretary of the Navy. U. S. S. BOSTON (SECOND RATE), Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, November 9, 1982. The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. : SIR: I have the honor to report that the danger of a political crisis in the Hawaiian Kingdom seems to have passed. The Queen has appointed a cabinet, after much pressure had been brought to bear, that is strong financially and favorable to American interests. The new ministry will probably be supported by the legislature, although much opposition has been aroused among the native members because they are not represented. It is doubtful, however, if the natives can secure enough votes to vote the cabinet out, though they would do so if possible. I am informed, from reliable sources, that the Queen had been strongly advised to dissolve the legislature and order a new election, which would have been unconstitutional, and which would probably have caused a revolution; but she was deterred by the presence of United States vessels of war. I inclose paper containing editorials on the situation. Very respectfully, G. C. WILTSE, Captain, Commanding U. S. S. Boston. __________ Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster. [Confidential.] No. 74.] UNITED STATES LEGATION, Honolulu, November 20, 1892. SIR: Fidelity to the trust imposed on me by the President, the Department of State, and the Senate, requires that I should make a careful and full statement of the financial, agricultural, social, and political condition of these islands. An intelligent and impartial examination of the facts can hardly fail to lead to the conclusion that the relations and policy of the United States toward Hawaii will soon demand some change, if not the adoption of decisive measures, with the aim to secure American interests and future supremacy by encouraging Hawaiian development and aiding to promote responsible government in these islands. It is unnecessary for me to allude to the deep interest and the settled policy of the United States Government in re- 189 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. spect of these islands, from the official days of John Quincy Adams and of Daniel Webster to the present time. In all that period, we have avowed the superiority of our interests to those of all other nations, and have always refused to embarrass our freedom of action by any alliance or arrangement with other powers as to the ultimate possession and government of the islands. Before stating the present political condition of the little kingdom, it is well to review the substantial data as to its area, its resources, its financial and business condition, its capabilities of material development, its population, the status of its landed property, its government, revenues, and expenditures, etc. PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS. The total area of the kingdom is about 6,000 square miles. Not including several small islands of little importance, the chief value of the land area is in the six islands of Oahu, Kauai, Maui, Molokai, Lanai, and Hawaii, the last named being nearly the size of all the rest of the group. The plains, valleys, and lowlands are fertile, while the highlands are adapted to the raising of extensive herds of cattle, horses, and sheep. The arable lands are adapted to the production of sugar, coffee, rice, bananas, oranges, lemons, pineapples, grapes and maize. Of the arable lands only such as are fitted for the production of sugar and rice have been much brought into use. The coffee raised is of superior quality, and finds ready market for home consumption and in San Francisco. There is no doubt that this product can be greatly extended. This opinion is sustained by the examination of experts and has been verified by successful results in coffee=raising, to which there is now being given special attention. The banana culture can be greatly extended, and the opportunities for the production of oranges are large and promising. Ripening at a time in the year different from those of southern California, the Hawaiian oranges can find a ready market in San Francisco, and especially in the cities of Oregon and Washington, where the islands procure most of their lumber for buildings and fences, and from which they procure coal, the consumption of which will necessarily increase for use in the sugar mills and the supply of steamers. For a quarter of a century the profits of sugar-raising have tended to divert capital and enterprise almost exclusively to the cane culture, to the neglect of the other industries and interests of the islands. Good government and the building of necessary roads and bridges, the Government assumption of the "crown lands," and the conversion of them into small homesteads for raising the crops already specified, would speedily stimulate general prosperity and increase the American and European families and freeholders, and aid to constitute a large number of responsible voters, thus giving stability to legislation and government. There are nearly 900,000 acres of "crown lands," and these, in the main, are among the most valuable of the islands. The rent paid for them goes to the Sovereign, and the amount of the income received is no doubt much less than it would be if these lands were owned and managed by private individuals. There have long been more or less abuses in the leasing of these lands, and it is well understood that the leases have been prolific sources of political favoritism and corruption. Well handled and sold at fitting opportunities, the proceeds of the crown lands would pay the national debt, provide adequate pensions for the two or three royalties, in case monarchy should 190 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. be abolished, and yet leave a balance of considerable amount for a permanent school fund. COMMERCIAL AND NAVAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ISLANDS. The value of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States for commercial and naval purposes has been well understood by American statesmen for more than half a century. The examination of the Hawaiian harbors and a careful consideration of their capabilities of defense, twenty years since, by Gen. Scofield and naval officers, whose opinions are on record in the Washington departments, plainly indicate how important these islands and harbors are to the future American commerce of the Pacific. Even to a nonexpert the great value and the easy defensibility of the harbors of Pearl City and of Honolulu are unmistakably obvious. Only six miles from each other, with narrow entrances backed by a continuous wall of mountains, each terminus of this natural barrier reaching to the sea, at relatively small expense these harbors can be impregnably fortified against all attack by sea and land. The harbor of Honolulu can now be entered by ships drawing 30 feet of water. But Pearl Harbor is larger and much preferable for naval purposes. It is only necessary to deepen the entrance by removing the bar of coral formation. This coral obstruction can be removed with comparative ease, and the expense would not be large. Opinions of practical men here, who have had to do with these coral formations, as well as my personal observation, go to show how readily it can be removed by modern explosives and the improved mechanical agencies. With a large island between it and the sea, a capacious, safe, and beautiful harbor is secured for American commercial and military marine just where the future greatness and the necessities of the United States imperatively require. Only those who have carefully examined the vast resources of the American Pacific States, and considered that nearly two-fifths of the immense area of the United States, through the transcontinental railways and by rivers and sounds, outlet on the Pacific, and have studied the data surely pointing to the vast future commerce of this western world, can adequately appreciate the importance of these harbors to the American nation, and the necessity of securing them against foreign rivals. If we neglect them the present occupants must suffer, and their necessities will force them in directions unfriendly to American interests. Circumstances are pressing, and no time should be lost in looking at the facts as they really exist. The strong inclination of several European powers to gain possession of all the islands in the Pacific, except such as are expressly protected by the United States, is plainly shown by what has taken place in recent years. The seizure of Gilbert, Johnson, and other islands, in the past few months, and what recently transpired in regard to Samoa, emphatically show that England certainly has not moderated her policy in the indicated regard, to which course the Canadian Government is undoubtedly the inspiring cause. The enormous cost of the Canadian Pacific Railway impels its managers to make the most desperate efforts to secure freight and passengers, and hence its aggressive plans to secure Pacific commerce and to gain political and commercial influence in these islands. The scheme of a British cable from Vancouver via Honolulu, as well as to Japan and China, and of establishing commercial and mail lines of steamers on the same routes, is not an idle dream. Powerful agencies are already working to these ends, and to effectively safeguard American interests on the Pacific and in these islands there is no time for 191 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. hesitation and delay. If the United States Government does not very promptly provide for laying a cable from San Francisco or San Diego to Honolulu or Hilo, it may be regarded as certain that a cable will be laid by British capital and be controlled by British managers. Pearl Harbor for a coaling station and an American cable between California and Hawaii are of immediate importance to American commercial and naval interests and to the maintenance of American influence on these islands. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLANDS. A question of vital importance to Hawaii and of American interest in and care for its future is that of its government. There has been in the last twenty years a great change in the political status of things here. Formerly the facts and circumstances appertaining to government on these islands were essentially different from what they are today. Then the population was chiefly native Hawaiian. The natives had long lived under a kind of feudal system, with rigid laws and customs, which gave to the numerous chiefs and the King absolute despotic power. The wisdom and the religious zeal of the Christian missionaries enabled them to acquire and exercise a strong influence for good over the chiefs and King as well. Thus a system of government and laws were established which were a great improvement of the former condition of things. The general good character of the men who effectively aided the Hawaiian monarch to carry on the Government for years secured fairly successful administration of law and the maintenance of public order at limited cost, the public revenues being small. But the numerous Hawaiian chiefs are in their graves. Their families are extinct. The original native Hawaiians are now so decimated as to number less than two- fifths of the population of the islands. The coming to the throne of the late King Kalakaua in 1873 was by legislative election, and but for the presence in the harbor and on shore of American marines and sailors, of the United States vessels of war, he would have failed to secure his crown against a determined mob in the interest of another aspirant. The great prosperity of the islands under the reciprocity treaty, stimulating the production of sugar, leading to a large American, European, and Asiatic immigration, caused a large increase of the Government revenues. This prosperous state of things also soon resulted in a large increase of the Government expenditures, in the addition of new offices, a large augmentation of salaries, this stimulating the desire for official places and patronage, exciting the greed of adventurous and too often unworthy political partisans. Easy going, unused to and incapable of safe and economical administration, the King, Kalakaua, too often, in his seventeen years of reign, fell into the hands of unscrupulous associates and advisers. The Government expenditures soon reached figures much above what the area and population of the little kingdom justified. But so long as the great profits of sugar=raising under the American tariff flowed into the islands, the excessive Government expenses could be paid without the principal taxpayers very sensibly realizing the burden. The adoption of a new constitution in 1887, taking from the King much of his former power and establishing legislative and ministerial responsibility, effected a beneficial change. But the great reduction of the profits of sugar-raising, rendering some of the plantations nearly worthless, and greatly lessening the income and market value of the others, has brought a condition of affairs which compels all the reflect- 192 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. ing and responsible citizens to see that the present expenses of the Government are much beyond what the islands can pay and much higher than wise legislation and proper economic administration require. But the difficulty of getting out of the old grooves, of scaling down salaries, and abolishing useless offices is hard to overcome. Nearly one-half of the population of the country have no voice in political affairs, unless exerted through corruption and bribery. The voting population is made up of several nationalities--Hawaiian, Portuguese, American, English, German, and others, the more intelligent and responsible of these generally acting together sufficiently to exercise a beneficial influence on legislation and administration. But the palace patronage and influence are still considerable, costing the country more than it is able to pay and returning to the county no positive advantages. Directly and indirectly, the palace probably costs the little kingdom $150,000 per year. A governor, at $5,000 a year, acting in harmony with the responsible men of the legislature, would be far better for the islands than the present monarchical Government. In truth, the monarchy here is an absurd anachronism. It has nothing on which it logically or legitimately stands. The feudal basis on which it once stood no longer existing, the monarchy now is only an impedient to good government-an obstruction to the prosperity and progress of the islands. Incapable of comprehending the principles of constitutional government, more likely to take the advice of unworthy counsel than of the more competent, the reigning Sovereign insists in dealing with what properly belongs to the legislature and to the ministers. Thus the palace is constantly open to superficial and irresponsible courtiers and to unprincipled adventures of different nationalities. Instead of exercising a salutary influence on public affairs it is the center of mal-administration and of the most vicious kind of politics. It is now, and it has been for the last twenty years, and is always likely to be, a fruitful source of public demoralization. It may be asked why do not the people of the islands at once reform this state of things? There is a considerable number of intelligent, energetic, and excellent citizens, of the different nationalities, in possession of the elective franchise. They are largely Americanized in their opinions and manners. They are sympathetic with American institutions. This is so of the Portuguese, the Germans, more or less of the English, and of the native Hawaiians and half-whites, as well as of the most of those of American parentage. But these unaided and alone can not well make the necessary changes in the existing condition of things. As a crown colony of Great Britain, or a Territory of the United States, the government modifications could be made readily, and good administration of the laws secured. Destiny and the vast future interests of the United States in the Pacific clearly indicate who, at no distant day, must be responsible for the government of these islands. Under a territorial government they could be as easily governed as any of the existing Territories of the United States. The men qualified are here to carry on good government, provided they have the support of the Government of the United States. Why not postpone American possession? Would it not be just as well for the United States to take the islands twenty-five years hence? Facts and obvious probabilities will answer both of these interrogations. Hawaii has reached the parting of the ways. She must now take the road which leads to Asia, or the other, which outlets her in America, gives her an American civilization and binds her to the care of American 193 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. destiny. The nonaction of the American Government here in thirty years will make of Hawaii a Singapore, or a Hongkong, which could be governed as a British colony, but would be unfit to be an American Territory or an American State under our constitutional system. If the American flag floats here at no distant day, the Asiatic tendencies can be arrested and controlled without retarding the material development of the islands, but surely advancing their prosperity by diversifying and expanding the industries, building roads and bridges, opening the public lands to small farmers from Europe and the United States, thus increasing the responsible voting population, and constituting a solid basis for American methods of government. Two-fifths of the people now here are Chinese and Japanese. If the present state of things is allowed to go on the Asiatic will soon largely preponderate, for the native Hawaiians are now decreasing at the rate of nearly one thousand per year. At the present prices of sugar, and at the prices likely to hold in the future, sugar-raising on these islands can be continued only by the cheapest possible labor-- that of the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Indian coolies. Americanize the islands, assume control of the "crown lands," dispose of them in small lots for actual settlers and freeholders for the raising of coffee, oranges, lemons, bananas, pineapples, and grapes, and the result soon will be to give permanent preponderance to a population and a civilization which will make the islands like southern California, and at no distant period convert them into gardens and sanitariums, as well as supply stations for American commerce, thus bringing everything here into harmony with American life and prosperity. To postpone American action many years is only to add to present unfavorable tendencies and to make future possession more difficult. It is proper to consider the following facts: The present Sovereign is not expected to live many years. The princess heir apparent has always been, and is likely always to be, under English influence. Her father is British in blood and prejudices, firmly intrenched here as collector of customs, an important and influential office. She has been for some years and still is in England; her patron there who has a kind of guardianship of her, T. H. Davies, is a Tory Englishman, who lived here many years, who still owns large property in the islands, and is a resolute and persistent opponent of American predominance, bitterly denouncing even the American acquisition of Pearl Harbor. Mr. Wodehouse, the English minister, has long resided here; his eldest son is married to a half-caste sister of the Crown Princess, another son is in the Honolulu post-office, and a daughter also is married to a resident of one of the islands. The death of the present Queen, therefore, would virtually place an English princess on the Hawaiian throne, and put in the hands of the ultra-English the patronage and influence of the palace. In the existing state of things, with non-American intervention, these palace influences, skillfully handled, are nearly equal, frequently superior, to the power of the legislature. Add to this palace power, in British hands, the influence of an adventurous, impecunious, and irresponsible mob of "hoodlums" and there results a state of things which would put it in the power of Canadian and ultra-British schemers, with a subsidy fund of $50,000, to secure control of the legislature, and by prompt and vigorous action secure Canadian and British franchises, privileges, and rights entirely legal, to get rid of which would cause embarrassment and expense to the United States and her allies here. As is well known to the Department of State, Secretary Marcy, F R 94--APP II-----13 194 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. with the approval of President Pierce and Cabinet, authorized the negotiation of a treaty for making these islands a Territory of the United States. Commissioner Gregg was authorized to facilitate the negotiation by the promise to pay $100,000 for pensions to the King, chiefs, and other official persons, on condition that the sovereignty and property of the islands should be transferred to the United States. Commissioner Gregg exceeded his instructions by stipulating to pay, in all, three times the sum which Secretary Marcy named in his instructions. These terms were deemed onerous and unacceptable by the Washington Department of State, and consequently the treaty was dropped, after all negotiations had been completed, the King finally being induced by his Scotch minister of foreign affairs not to sign it, though the King and cabinet had previously given their support to the spirit and terms of the negotiations and the conclusions reached. The embarrassments and objections that then existed as to the number of the royal princes and chiefs, the small number of the American population, the want of ready communication with the United States, and distance from Washington, now no longer stand in the way of making Hawaii a well governed and prosperous United States Territory. The reasons for annexation in 1854 were certainly much less adequate and pressing than they are now. THE EXISTING BUSINESS STATUS. It is well to consider the existing state of things here resulting from the change in the United States sugar tariff. Only personal observation and a careful investigation of the facts can give an adequate idea of the sever blow sugar raised here has received. The production of sugar being the main business of the islands, the great reduction of the market price has effected powerfully the entire affairs and condition of the islands. I think it underestimating the truth to express the opinion that the loss to the owners of the sugar plantations and mills, etc., and the consequent depreciation of other property by the passage of the McKinley bill, wise and beneficial as that measure is proving to be for the vast interests of the United States, has not been less than $12,000,000, a large portion of this loss falling on Americans residing here and in California. Unless some positive measures of relief be granted, the depreciation of sugar property here will continue to go on. Wise, bold action of the United States will rescue the property holders from great loss, give the islands a government which will put an end to a worse than useless expenditure of a large proportion of the revenues of the country, using them fro the building of roads and bridges, thus helping to develop the natural resources of the islands, aiding to diversify the industries, and to increase the number of the responsible citizens. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE! One of two courses seem to me absolutely necessary to be followed, either bold and vigorous measures for annexation or a "customs union," an ocean cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied but not necessarily stipulated American protectorate over the islands. I believe the former to be the better, that which will prove much the more advantageous to the islands, and the cheapest and least embarrassing in the end for the United States. If it was wise for the United 195 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. States, through Secretary Marcy, thirty-eight years ago, to offer to expend $100,000 to secure a treaty of annexation, it certainly can not be chimerical or unwise to expend $100,000 to secure annexation in the near future. To-day the United States has five times the wealth she possessed in 1854, and the reasons now existing for annexation are much stronger than they were then. I can not refrain from expressing the opinion with emphasis that the golden house is near at hand. A perpetual customs union and the acquisition of Pearl Harbor, with an implied protectorate, must be regarded as the only allowable alternative. This would require the continual presence in the harbor of Honolulu of a United States vessel of war and the constant watchfulness of the United States minister while the present bungling, unsettled, and expensive political rule would go on, retarding the development of the islands, leaving at the end of twenty-five years more embarrassment to annexation than exists to- day, the property far less valuable, and the population less American than they would be if annexation were soon realized. It may be said that annexation would involve the obligation of paying to the Hawaiian sugar-producers the same rate of bounties now paid to American producers, thus imposing too heavy a demand on the United States Treasury. It is a sufficient answer to this question to say that it could be specifically provided in the terms of annexation that the United States Government should pay 6 mills per pound--$12 per ton--to the Hawaiian sugar-raisers, and this only so long as the present sugar-bounty system of the United States shall be maintained. Careful inquiry and investigation bring me to the conclusion that this small bounty would tide the Hawaiian sugar- planters over their present alarming condition and save the islands from general business depletion and financial disaster. Could justice to American interest in the islands and care for their future welfare do less than this? To give Hawaii a highly favorable treaty while she remains outside the American Union would necessarily give the same advantages to hostile foreigners, those who would continue to antagonize our commercial and political interests here here, as well as those of American blood and sympathies. It is a well authenticated fact that the American sentiment here in 1890, the last year of the great prosperity under the sugar provisions of the reciprocity treaty, was much less manifest than before the treaty had gone into effect, and less pronounced than when Secretary Marcy authorized the negotiation of the annexation treaty in 1854. It is equally true that the desire here at this time for annexation is much stronger than in 1889. Besides, so long as the islands retain their own independent government there remains the possibility that England or the Canadian Dominion might secure one of the Hawaiian harbors for a coaling station. Annexation excludes all dangers of this kind. Which of the two lines of policy and action shall be adopted our statesmen and our Government must decide. Certain it is that the interest of the United States and the welfare of these islands will not permit the continuance of the existing state and tendency of things. Having for so many years extended a helping hand to the islands and encouraging the American residents and their friends at home to the extent we have, we can not refrain now from aiding them with vigorous measures, without injury to ourselves and those of our "kith and kin," and without neglecting American opportunities that never seemed so obvious and pressing as they do now. I have no doubt that 196 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. the more thoroughly the bed rock and controlling facts touching the Hawaiian problem are understood by our Government and by the American public, the more readily they will be inclined to approve the views I have expressed so inadequately in this communication. I am, sir, your obedient servant, JOHN L. STEVENS. Hon. JOHN W. FOSTER, Secretary of State. 197 Senate Ex. Doc. No. 76, Fifty-second Congress, second session. __________ M E S S A G E FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TRANSMITTING A treaty of annexation concluded on the 14th day of February, 1893, between the United States and the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands. __________ FEBRUARY 15, 1893.-Read; treaty read the first time, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and, together with the message and accompanying papers, ordered to be printed in confidence for the use of the Senate. FEBRUARY 17, 1893.-Injunction of secrecy removed and ordered to be printed. ______________ To the Senate: I transmit herewith, with a view to its ratification, a treaty of annexation concluded on the 14th day of February, 1893, between Hon. John W. Foster, Secretary of State, who was duly empowered to act in that behalf on the part of the United States, and Lorrin A. Thurston, W. R. Castle, W. C. Wilder, C. L. Carter, and Joseph Marsden, the commissioners on the part of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands. The treaty, it will be observed, does not attempt to deal in detail with the questions that grow out of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. The commissioner representing the Hawaiian Government have consented to leave to the future and to the just and benevolent purposes of the United States the adjustment of all such questions. I do not deem it necessary to discuss at any length the conditions which have resulted in this decisive action. It has been the policy of the administration not only to respect, but to encourage the continuance of an independent government in the Hawaiian Islands so long as it afforded suitable guarantees for the protection of life and property and maintained a stability and strength that gave adequate security against the domination of any other power. The moral support of this Government has continually manifested itself in the most friendly diplomatic relations, and in many acts of courtesy to the Hawaiian rulers. The overthrow of the monarchy was not in any way promoted by this Government, but had its origin in what seems to have been a reactionary and revolutionary policy on the part of Queen Liliuokalani, which put in serious peril not only the large and preponderating interests of 198 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. the United States in the islands, but all foreign interests, and indeed the decent administration of civil affairs and the peace of the islands. It is quite evident that the monarchy had become effete and the Queen's government so weak and inadequate as to be the prey of designing and unscrupulous persons.. The restoration of Queen Liliuokalani to her throne is undesirable, if not impossible, and unless actively supported by the United States would be accompanied by serious disaster and the disorganization of all business interests. The influence and interest of the United States in the islands must be increased and not diminished. Only two courses are now open; one the establishment of a protectorate by the United States, and the other, annexation full and complete. I think the latter course, which has been adopted in the treaty, will be highly promotive of the best interests of the Hawaiian people, and is the only one that will adequately secure the interests of the United States. These interests are not wholly selfish. It is essential that none of the other great powers shall secure these islands. Such a possession would not consist with our safety and with the peace of the world. This view of the situation is so apparent and conclusive that no protest has been heard from any government against proceedings looking to annexation. Every foreign representative at Honolulu promptly acknowledged the provisional government, and I think there is a general concurrence in the opinion that the deposed queen ought not to be restored. Prompt action upon this treaty is very desirable. If it meets the approval of the Senate peace and good order will be secured in the islands under existing laws until such time as Congress can provide by legislation a permanent form of government for the islands. This legislation should be, and I do not doubt will be, not only just to the natives and all other residents and citizens of the islands, but should be characterized by great liberality and a high regard to the rights of all the people and of all foreigners domiciled there. The correspondence which accompanies the treaty will put the Senate in possession of all the facts known to the Executive. BENJ. HARRISON. EXECUTIVE MANSION, February 15, 1893. __________ The PRESIDENT: The undersigned, Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President, with a view to obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate thereto, should such a course be in the judgment of the President for the public interest, a treaty, signed at Washington on the 14th day of February, instant, by the undersigned and the accredited commissioners of the existing provisional government of the Hawaiian Islands, in representation of their respective Governments, for the full and absolute cession of the said islands and all their dependencies to the United States forever, with provision for the temporary government of those islands, under the sovereign authority of the United States, until Congress shall otherwise enact. With this treaty the undersigned submits to the President copies of the correspondence recently exchanged, showing the course of events in the Hawaiian Islands as respects the overthrow of the late monarch- 199 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. ical form of government, the creation of a provisional government thereof in the name of the Hawaiian people, the recognition of the same by the representatives there of the United States and of all other powers, the dispatch of a commission to this capital to negotiate for a union of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands with the Government of the United States, and the outcome of those negotiations in the treaty herewith submitted. The change of government in the Hawaiian Islands, thus chronicled, was entirely unexpected so far as this Government was concerned. It is true that for some months past the Hawaiian press and the advices received from the diplomatic and consular representatives at Honolulu indicated political uncertainty, party intrigues, and legislative opposition, but not more so than at many times in the past history of the islands, and certainly not suggestive of an overthrow of the monarchy through popular resistance to the unconstitutional acts of the late sovereign. At no time had Mr. Stevens been instructed with regard to his course in the event of a revolutionary uprising. The well-established policy of this Government, maintained on many occasions from its earliest establishment, to hold relations with any de facto government in possession of the effective power of the State and having the acquiescence of the governed, being ample to meet unforeseen contingencies, no instructions in this specific sense were indeed necessary; and the minister, without explicit instructions, was expected and constrained to use his best judgment, in accordance with fundamental precedent, as the emergency should arise. The change was in fact abrupt and unlooked-for by the United States minister or the naval commander. At a moment of apparent tranquility, when the political excitement and controversy of the immediately preceding three months had been to all appearances definitely allayed, and when, as appears from dispatches from the minister and from the commanding officer of the Boston, a settlement of differences seemed to have been reached, Minster Stevens quitted the capital for a brief excursion of ten days to a neighboring island, on the Boston, the only naval vessel of the United States at the islands. On returning to Honolulu on January 14 the crisis was found to be in full vigor and to have already reached proportions which made inevitable either the success of Queen Liliuokalani's attempt to subvert the constitution by force or the downfall of the monarchy. On Saturday, the 14th of January, the capital was wholly controlled by the royal troops, including a large additional force of over 500 armed men not authorized by Hawaiian law. On the same day the first call to arms in opposition to the Queen was issued, and the citizens' committee of safety was developed. During the 14th, 15th, and most of the 16th, the two parties confronted each other in angry hostility, with every indication of an armed conflict at any moment. It was not until late in the afternoon of Monday, the 16th, after request for protection had been made by many citizens of the United States residing in Honolulu, that a force of marines was landed from the Boston, by direction of the minister, and in conformity with the standing instructions which for many years have authorized the naval forces of the United States to cooperate with the minister for the protection of the lives and property of American citizens in case of imminent disorder. The marines, when landed, took no part whatever toward influencing the course of events. Their presence was wholly precautionary, and only such disposition was made of them as was calculated to subserve the particular end in view. They were distributed that night between 200 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. the legation and the consulate, where they occupied inner courts and a private hall rented for their accommodation. Beyond a sentry at the door of each post, and the occasional appearance of an officer passing from one post to another, no demonstration whatever was made by the landed forces, nor was the uniform of the United States visible upon the streets. They thus remained, isolated and inconspicuous, until after the success of the Provisional Government and the organization of an adequate protective force thereunder. At the time the Provisional Government took possession of the Government buildings, no troops or officers of the United States were present or took any part whatever in the proceedings. No public recognition was accorded to the Provisional Government by the United States minister until after the Queen's abdication and when they were in effective possession of the Government buildings, the archives, the treasury, the barracks, the police station, and all the potential machinery of the Government. Then, and not until then, when the Provisional Government had obtained full de facto control, was the new order of things recognized by the United States minister, whose formal letter of recognition was promptly followed by like action on the part of the representatives of all foreign governments resident on the Hawaiian Islands. There is not the slightest indication at any time prior to such formal recognition in full accord with the long-established rule and invariable precedents of this Government, did the United States minister take any part in promoting the change, either by intimidating the Queen or by giving assurance of support to the organizers of the Provisional Government. The immediate cause of the change is clearly seen to have been the unconstitutional and intemperate acts of the Queen herself, in attempting to coerce her responsible ministers and to annul the existing constitution and replace it arbitrarily by another of her own choice. The Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, is, by all usual and proper tests, in the sole and supreme possession of power and in control of all the resources of the Hawaiian nation, not only through the Queen's formal submission, but through its possession of all the armed forces, arms and ammunitions, public offices, and administration of law, unopposed by any adherents of the late Government. On the first instant, subsequently to the departure of the Hawaiian special commissioners, the United States minister at Honolulu, at the request of the Provisional Government, placed the Hawaiian Government under the protection of the United States to insure the security of life and property during the pending negotiations at Washington and without interfering with the administration of public affairs by the said Government. An instruction has been sent to the minister, commending his action in so far as it lay within the purview of standing instructions to the legation and to the naval commanders of the United States in Hawaiian waters, and tended to cooperate with the administration of affairs by the Provisional Government, but disavowing any steps in excess of such instructions whereby the authority and power of the United States might appear to have been asserted to the impairment of the independent sovereignty of the Hawaiian Government by the assumption of a formal protectorate. In this condition of things, the five commissioners named by the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands reached Washington on the 3d instant, bearing authentic letters from the Hawaiian Government accrediting them to the President, and conferring upon them full 201 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. powers to negotiate for the union of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. On the 4th instant the commissioners were accorded an interview with the undersigned, at the request of the regularly accredited Hawaiian minister, Mr. J. Mott Smith, and submitted their credentials, accompanied by a statement of events leading up to and connected with the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the Provisional Government. At a second conference on the same day the commissioners submitted to the undersigned the proposition of the Provisional Government, containing the terms upon which that Government desired the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. A copy of this proposition is inclosed. Frequent conferences have since been held at the Department of State, and all question connected with the subject have been carefully examined and discussed, until a concurrence of views on the part of the negotiating parties was reached on the 14th instant. In drafting and agreeing upon the treaty now transmitted, the undersigned has sought, under your direction, to effect thereby the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States with as few conditions as possible and with a full reservation to Congress of its legislative prerogatives. An examination of the provisions of this treaty will show that to Congress is reserved the determination of all questions affecting the form of government of the annexed territory, the citizenship and the elective franchise of its inhabitants, the manner and terms under which the revenue and navigation laws of the United States are to be extended thereto, and all other questions relating to the economic and political status of the islands. As there is no provision in the existing legislation of Congress whereby the Executive power can provide an organized form of government for new territory annexed to the Union, or extend over it the laws of the United States and cause the same to be executed, it was deemed necessary to continue the existing government and laws of the Hawaiian Islands until congress should have an opportunity to legislate on the subject; but a provision has been inserted in the treaty for the exercise by the Executive of the United States of a veto power upon the acts of that government during the interregnum. The temporary maintenance of the existing political institutions of the islands seems the more appropriate in view of the fact that the Hawaiian constitution, of which a copy is inclosed herewith, and the Hawaiian laws are based upon principles similar to those contained in our own organic law and the principles of the common law. It is to be noted that, according to a recognized principle of international law, the obligations of treaties, even when some of their stipulations are in terms perpetual, expire in case either of the contracting parties loses its existence as an independent state. The foreign treaties of the Hawaiian Islands therefore terminate, upon annexation, with the competence of the government thereof to hold diplomatic relations. An examination of these treaties show, however, that they contain no stipulations which would embarrass either the Hawaiian Islands or the United States by their termination. Accompanying the treaty are tables giving full details as to the area of the territory annexed, the public debt, the public lands, the annual allowances to and revenue of the late royal household, and statistics as to the population, revenues, commerce, and other economic matters relating to the islands. It is gratifying to be able to state that pending the negotiations leading up to the treaty herewith submitted the undersigned has received 202 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. such assurances from the representatives of the leading powers of the world and from our own ministers abroad as leads to the conviction that the incorporation of the Hawaiian Islands into our Union will be regarded by these powers with satisfaction or ready acquiescence. Respectfully submitted. JOHN W. FOSTER. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, February 15, 1893. _______ 1 The United States of America and the Provisional Government 2 of the Hawaiian Islands, in view of the natural dependence of 3 those Islands upon the United States, of their geographical prox- 4 imity thereto, of the intimate part taken by citizens of the United 5 States in there implanting the seeds of Christian civilization, of the 6 long continuance of their exclusive reciprocal commercial relations 7 whereby their mutual interest have been developed, and the pre- 8 ponderant and paramount share thus acquired by the United 9 States and their citizens in the productions, industries and trade 10 of the said Islands, and especially in view of the desire expressed 11 by the said Government of the Hawaiian Islands that those Islands 12 shall be incorporated into the United States as an integral part 13 thereof and under their sovereignty, in order to provide for and 14 assure the security and prosperity of the said Islands, the High 15 Contracting Parties have determined to accomplish by treaty an 16 object so important to their mutual and permanent welfare. 17 To this end, the High Contracting Parties have conferred full 18 power and authority upon their respectively appointed Plenipoten- 19 tiaries, to wit: 20 The President of the United States of America, John W. Foster, 21 Secretary of State of the United States; and 22 The President of the Executive and Advisory Councils of the 23 Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, Lorrin A. Thurs- 24 ton, William R. Castle, William C. Wilder, Charles L. Carter, and 25 Joseph Marsden; 26 And the said Plenipotentiaries, after having communicated to 27 each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, 28 have agreed upon and concluded the following articles: 1 ARTICLE I. 2 The Government of the Hawaiian Islands hereby cedes, from the 3 date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, absolutely 203 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. 4 and without reserve to the United States forever all rights of sov- 5 ereignty of whatsover kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and 6 their dependencies, renouncing in favor of the United States every 7 sovereign right of which as an independent nation it is now pos- 8 sessed; and henceforth said Hawaiian Islands and every island 9 and key thereunto appertaining and each and every portion thereof 10 shall become and be an integral part of the territory of the United 11 States. 1 ARTICLE II. 2 The Government of the Hawaiian Islands also cedes and transfers 3 to the United States the absolute fee and ownership of all public, 4 government or crown lands, public buildings or edifices, ports, 5 harbors, fortifications, military or naval equipments, and all other 6 public property of every kind and description belonging to the 7 Government of the Hawaiian Islands, together with every right 8 and appurtenance thereunto appertaining. The existing laws of 9 the United States relative to public lands shall not apply to such 10 lands in the Hawaiian Islands, but the Congress of the United 11 States shall enact special laws for their management and disposi- 12 tion: Provided, that all revenue from or proceeds of the same, ex- 13 cept as regards such part thereof as may be used or occupied for 14 the civil, military or naval purposes of the United States or may 15 be assigned to the use of the local Government, shall be used solely 16 for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for 17 educational and other public purposes. 1 ARTICLE III. 2 Until Congress shall otherwise provide, the existing Govern- 3 ment and laws of the Hawaiian Islands are hereby continued, sub- 4 ject to the paramount authority of the United States. The Pres- 5 dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall ap- 6 point a Commissioner to reside in said Islands who shall have the 7 power to veto any act of said Government, and an act disapproved 8 by him shall thereupon be void and of no effect unless approved 9 by the President. 10 Congress shall, within one year from the exchange of the rati- 11 fications of this Treaty, enact the necessary legislation to extend 12 to the Hawaiian Islands the laws of the United States respecting 13 duties upon imports, the internal revenue, commerce and naviga- 204 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. 14 tion; but until Congress shall otherwise provide, the existing com- 15 mercial relations of the Hawaiian Islands both with the United 16 States and foreign countries shall continue as regards the commerce 17 of said Islands with the rest of the United States and with foreign 18 countries, but this shall not be construed as giving to said Islands 19 the power to enter into any new stipulation or agreement whatso- 20 ever or to have diplomatic intercourse with any foreign Govern- 21 ment. The Consular representatives of foreign powers now resi- 22 dent in the Hawaiian Islands shall be permitted to continue in the 23 exercise of their consular functions until they can receive their 24 exequaturs from the Government of the United States. 1 ARTICLE IV. 2 The further immigration of Chinese laborers into the Hawaiian 3 Islands is hereby prohibited until Congress shall otherwise pro- 4 vide. Furthermore, Chinese persons of the classes now or here- 5 after excluded by law from entering the United States will not be 6 permitted to come from the Hawaiian Islands to other parts of the 7 United States, and if so coming shall be subject to the same pen- 8 alties as if entering from a foreign country. 1 ARTICLE V. 2 The public debt of the Hawaiian Islands, lawfully existing at the 3 date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, including 4 the amounts due to depositors in the Hawaiian Postal Savings 5 Banks, is hereby assumed by the Government of the United 6 States; but the liability of the United States in this regard shall 7 in no case exceed three and one quarter millions of dollars. So 8 long, however, as the existing Government and the present com- 9 mercial relations of the Hawaiian Islands are continued, as here- 10 in before provided, said Government shall continue to pay the 11 interest on said debt. 1 ARTICLE VI. 2 The Government of the United States agrees to pay to Liliuo- 3 kalani, the late Queen, within one year from the date of the ex- 4 change of the ratifications of this Treaty the sum of twenty thousand 5 dollars, and annually thereafter a like sum of twenty thousand 6 dollars during the term of her natural life, provided she in good 205 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. 7 faith submits to the authority of the Government of the United 8 States and the local Government of the Islands. 9 And the Government of the United States further agrees to 10 pay to the Princess Kaiulani within one year from the date of the 11 exchange of the ratifications of this treaty the gross sum of one 12 hundred and fifty thousand dollars, provided she in good faith 13 submits to the authority of the Government of the United States 14 and the local Government of the Islands. 1 ARTICLE VII. 2 The present Treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United 3 States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, on the 4 one part, and by the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian 5 Islands on the other, and the ratifications thereof shall be ex- 6 changed at Honolulu as soon as possible. Such exchange shall be 7 made on the part of the United States by the Commissioner here- 8 inbefore provided for, and it shall operate as a complete and final 9 conveyance to the United States of all the rights of sovereignty 10 and property herein ceded to them. Within one month after such 11 exchange of ratifications the Provisional Government shall furnish 12 said Commissioner with a full and complete schedule of all the 13 public property herein ceded and transferred. 14 In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed 15 the above articles and have hereunto affixed their seals. 16 Done in duplicate at the city of Washington this fourteenth day 17 of February, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-three. 18 JOHN W. FOSTER, [SEAL] 19 LORRIN A. THURSTON, [SEAL] 20 WILLIAM R. CASTLE, [SEAL] 21 WILLIAM C. WILDER, [SEAL] 22 CHARLES L. CARTER, [SEAL] 23 JOSEPH MARSDEN. [SEAL] 206 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. List of accompanying documents. No. 1. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster (telegram), January 18, 1893. No. 2. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, January 18, 1893. No. 3. Mr. Dole to Mr. Foster, January 18, 1893. No. 4. Ex-Queen Liliuokalani to the President, January 18, 1893. No. 5. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, January 19, 1893. No. 6. Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens (telegram), January 28, 1893. No. 7. Mr. Tracy to Mr. Foster, January 28, 1893. No. 8. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster (telegram), February 1, 1893. No. 9. Mr. Smith to Mr. Foster, February 3, 1893. No. 10. Mr. Tracy to Mr. Foster, February 3, 1893. No. 11. The Hawaiian special commissioners to Mr. Foster, February 3, 1893. No. 12. Credential letters of the Hawaiian special commissioners, exhibited February 4, 1893. No. 13. Commissions of the Hawaiian special commissioners, exhibited February 4, 1893. No. 14. The Hawaiian special commissioners to Mr. Foster, February 4, 1893. No. 15. The Hawaiian special commissioners to Mr. Foster, February 11, 1893. No. 16. Mr. Carter to Mr. Foster, February 11, 1893. No. 17. Mr. Tracy to Mr. Foster, February 11, 1893. No. 18. Mr. Foster to Mr. Stevens, February 11, 1893. No. 19. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, February 1, received February 14, 1893. No. 20. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, February 1, received February 14, 1893. No. 21. Constitution of the Hawaiian Islands. No. 22. Statistical tabulated statements pertaining to the Hawaiian Islands. A. Population in 1878, 1884, and 1890; voters in 1890. B. Property, real and personal. C. Schools: Number, attendance, and nationality of teachers. D. Public debt, as of March 31, 1892. E. Sugar plantations, value, area, ownership, wages. F. Taxation, internal, proceeds of, and per capita in 1882, 1884, 1886, 1888, 1890, and 1891. G. Revenues and expenditures, biennial periods from 1878-'80 to 1890-'92. H. Receipts, expenditures, cash balances, and public debt in 1880, 1882, 1884, 1886, 1888, and 1892. I. Imports, detailed statement of, from 1883 to 1892; values. J. Exports, detailed statement of, from 1882, to 1891; quantities and values. K. Imports and exports, by countries, from 1884 to 1891. L. Imports and exports, and customs receipts annual value of, from 1882 to 1891. M. Navigation, nationality of vessels engaged in the foreign trade with the Hawaiian Islands from 1882 to 1891. __________ No. 1. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster. [Telegram.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, Honolulu, H. I., January 18, 1893. Via San Francisco, January 28. (Received January 28.) Events in Hawaii in the past few days have moved rapidly. an entire overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy and the establishment of a Provisional Government in the interest of the whole people of the islands without the sacrifice of a single life. The new government is in full possession of the islands and was promptly recognized by all the diplomatic representatives. The four men of whom it is composed are of high character, one of whom resigned his position as one of the supreme judges to assume the place. Full dispatches by the mail leaving Honolulu to-day by special steamer. STEVENS. United States Minister. 207 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. No. 2. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster. No. 79.] UNITED STATES LEGATION, Honolulu, January 18, 1893. (Received February 3.) SIR: In my 73 of November 8 I gave full information of the surrender of the Queen to the wishes of the legislature by the formation of a ministry composed of men of intelligence and wealth possessing the entire confidence of the business men and the more responsible citizens of the country. But this surrender of the Queen and of those surrounding her was only seeming. As soon as the principal appropriations had been voted and the legislative work was nearly concluded, several of the best members having already left for their homes, a remarkable conspiracy was revealed. The undersigned, for the first time since he has been at the head of this legation, January 4 took passage for Hilo and the volcano on the U. S. S. Boston for the benefit of the health of himself and of his daughter, it being also desirable that the town of the second importance in the islands should have this attention at the time the Boston was making a visit to Hawaii, the chief island in the group. Beyond all doubt, immediately after the Boston and myself had left Honolulu the unscrupulous adventurers around the Queen improved the opportunity to push through the legislature an astounding lottery franchise with the obvious intent to sell it out to the Louisiana lottery men. This was worked by some of the same parties supposed to be of the powerful opium ring whose four points of operation are Vancouver, Sand Francisco, Honolulu, and Hongkong. They distributed the lottery stock among the native members of the legislature in large figures. Notwithstanding the strong opposition of all the best people of the islands, including whites and natives, and the emphatic opposition of the chamber of commerce, the Queen and her palace favorite gave their warmest support to the lottery bill and signed it at once. She was to be immediately compensated by being allowed to proclaim a new constitution, restoring to the Crown the old despotic prerogatives in direct violation of the existing constitution, which provides for the only mode of change, which is by the action of successive legislatures. Returning on the Boston from our Hilo trip on the 14th instant, we found the legislature was to be prorogued at 12 a.m., one-half hour after my arrival at the legation. The prorogation completed, members of the legislature, diplomatic corps, judges of the supreme court, and other officials went to the palace by invitation. In the meantime it began to be known in public circles the Queen's intention to proclaim the revolutionary constitution. This resulted in raising an excitement which alarmed her confidants and caused some of them to draw back. This consumed time, so that she could not secure the signatures of her new cabinet as she had expected. In the meantime the diplomatic corps grew weary and left the palace, realizing that the invitation to be present was a trick. As I had just returned, weary from my voyage, I had not received the invitation, the chamberlain knowing I was absent when he invited the English, Portuguese, French, and Japanese diplomatic representatives the day before. In the short meanwhile I had suspicioned the trick. Finally, the Queen appeared in the throne room, before the supreme judges and other officials, in an extreme passion of anger, and avowed her purpose to postpone her revolutionary constitution for a 208 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. brief period, and then went upon the balcony and spoke with great passion in the same strain to those around the palace, principally her retainers and the royal guard, her determination to proclaim her constitution at another time. What I have described as to the lottery legislation, the forcing out of the responsible cabinet of November 8 and appointing the lottery cabinet, two of whom had been voted out of the ministry during the legislative session by a two-thirds vote for the best of reasons. It was the lottery bribe and the autocratic design of the Queen that quickly precipitated events. A mass meeting of the citizens was called to meet on Monday, the 16th, at 2 p. m., which assembled in the largest hall in the city. Short as was the notice, over 1,300 of the principal citizens of Honolulu and from other islands, who happened to be in the city, were in attendance. This meeting included merchants, bankers, professional men, the principal business men, and the mechanics, the chief German and some of the leading English merchants and other nationalities, as wee as American residents. It is said such an assemblage was never before equaled in Honolulu. Intelligent American visitors here say that such a public meeting would do credit to a meeting of a similar class of citizens in our best American cities. The assemblage was a unit in feeling and purpose. The speeches and resolutions are on the printed slips I herewith inclose. This remarkable uprising of the best citizens, including nearly all of the chief property holders, the Tahitian marshal and palace favorite did not dare attempt to suppress. A committee of public safety was at once created to meet the emergency and to prevent anarchy and riot. It was fortunate that the Boston was in the harbor. The committee on public safety called on me for aid. I promptly addressed to the commander of the Boston , Capt. G. S. Wiltse, the following note: UNITED STATES LEGATION, Honolulu, January 16, 1893. SIR: In view of the existing critical circumstances in Honolulu, including an inadequate legal force, I request you to land marines and sailors from the ship under your command for the protection of the United States legation and United States consulate, and to secure the safety of American life and property. Very truly, yours, JOHN L. STEVENS. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States. Capt. G. C. WILTSE, Commander U. S. S. Boston. A copy of the call of the committee of public safety for aid is inclosed. Promptly the men from the Boston were landed. Detachments were placed around the legation and the consulate, the principal members having marched to a central hall for shelter and headquarters; the night being at hand, the public anxiety being especially strong as to what might be done by irresponsible persons in the night, the landing of the men of the Boston so promptly gave immediate relief to the public anxiety. As soon as practicable a Provisional Government was constituted, composed of four highly respectable men, with Judge Dole at the head, he having resigned his place on the supreme bench to assume this responsibility. He was born in Honolulu, of American parentage, educated here and in the United States, and is of the highest reputation among all citizens, both natives and whites. P. C. Jones is a native of Boston, Mass., wealthy, possessing property interest in the islands, 209 HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. and a resident here for many years. The other two members are of the highest respectability. The committee of public safety forthwith took possession of the Government buildings, archives, and treasury, and installed the Provisional Government at the heads of the respective departments. This being an accomplished fact, I promptly recognized the Provisional Government as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands. The English minister, the Portuguese charge d'affaires, the French and the Japanese commissioners promptly did the same; these, with myself, being the only members of the diplomatic corps residing here. All is quiet here now. Without the sacrifice of a single life this change of government has been accomplished. Language can hardly express the enthusiasm and the profound feeling of relief at this peaceful and salutary change of government. The underlying cause of this profound feeling among the citizens in the hope that the United States Government will allow these islands to pass to American control and become American soil. A commission of citizens, duly accredited, will go by the steamer that takes this dispatch to Washington, to state the wishes of the Provisional Government and of the responsible people of the islands, and to give a complete account of the existing state of things here. It is proper that I should add, that the presence of the Boston here has been of the highest importance, and the behavior of officers and men has been admirable. Capt. Wiltse has exercised prudence and great firmness, while he and the undersigned have recognized only accomplished facts and have not allowed the use of the United States force for any but the most conservative reasons. I am, sir, JOHN L. STEVENS. Written copy by future mail. S. _______ [Inclosure 1 in No. 79.] PROCLAMATION. In its earlier history Hawaii possessed a constitutional government honestly and economically administered in the public interest. The Crown called to its assistance as advisers able, hones and conservative men, whose integrity was unquestioned even by their political opponents. The stability of the Government was assured, armed resistance and revolution unthought of, popular rights were respected, and the privileges of the subject from time to time increased and the prerogatives of the sovereign diminished by the voluntary acts of the successive Kings. With very few exceptions this state of affairs continued until the expiration of the first few years of the reign of His late Majesty Kalakaua At this time a change was discernible in the spirit animating the Chief Executive and in the influences surrounding the throne. A steadily increasing disposition was manifested on the part of the King to extend the royal prerogatives; to favor adventurers and persons of no character or standing in the community; to encroach upon the rights and privileges of the people by steadily increasing corruption of electors, and by means of the power and influence of officeholders and other corrupt means to illegitimately influence the elections, resulting in the final absolute control of not only the executive and legislative, but to a certain extent the judicial departments of the Government in the interests of absolutism. This finally resulted in the revulsion of feeling and popular uprising of 1887, which wrested from the King a large portion of his ill-gotten powers. The leaders of this movement were not seeking personal aggrandizement, political power, or the suppression of the native Government. If this had been their object it could easily have been accomplished, for they had the absolute control of the situation. F R 94--APP II-----14 210